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Japanese Foreign Aid: Suggested Legislation
to Guide Administrative Distribution of
Foreign Aid
Darin R. Greenent
INTRODUCTION
In 1989 Japan became the largest donor of official development
assistance (ODA) in the world.' Japan's net disbursements of ODA
totaled $8.96 billion, surpassing the United States, which was second with
$7.66 billion.2 Since Japan began disbursing foreign aid in 1954, the
amount of aid has doubled roughly every five years.'
Japan has had difficulty managing this mercurial growth. The fast
rate of growth combined with inadequate staffing has produced a compli-
cated and inconsistent system of policy formulation and implementation.
Numerous examples of ineffective or environmentally harmful projects
attest to the waste and harm endemic to Japan's aid program.
Japan's difficulties in coping with the growth have been exacerbated
by the absence of legislative standards to guide the aid bureaucracy's pol-
t B.A. 1987, Stanford University; J.D. Candidate 1992, The University of Washington.
1. Official development assistance is a standard term which was developed by the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development to describe foreign development assistance that meets certain qualitative standards.
ODA is defined as those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided
by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each
transaction of which meets the following tests:
a) It is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of
developing countries as its main objective, and
b) It is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25 per cent.
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Geographical Distribution of Finan-
cial Flows to Developing Countries-Disbursements, Commitments & Economic Indicators 341
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1990).
2. Margo Grimm, Japan Ranked as World's Top Aid Donor, 26B Japan Economic Institute
Report 2 (July 6, 1990) ("Top Aid Donor').
3. See generally, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's Official Development
Assistance: 1989 Annual Report (Association for Promotion of International Cooperation, 1990)
("Japan's ODA").
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icy-making and administrative branches. In the absence of guiding legis-
lation, several shortcomings have developed: a foreign aid bureaucracy
that is often more responsive to pressure from the Japanese private sector
than to the development needs of recipient countries, an ineffective pro-
ject selection and evaluation system, and an inattention to the harmful
environmental effects of Japanese aid funded projects.
Japan should adopt a set of basic legislative rules to guide its expen-
diture of aid. The provisions should outline priorities that are consistent
with the development oriented nature of official development assistance
and responsive to the Japanese aid program's shortcomings. Once formu-
lated, the legislation should be adopted as soon as possible, because the
benefits that will accrue from such a fundamental improvement in the
multibillion dollar program will be considerable.
This Comment analyzes the need for guiding legislation in the Japa-
nese foreign aid program. First, the Comment describes the Japanese aid
program and its shortcomings. It then suggests guiding legislation and
analyzes the improvements such legislation will effectuate.
I. THE JAPANESE AID PROGRAM
A. The Amount of Development Assistance
In 1989 Japan became the largest donor of ODA in the world.4
Japan's net disbursements of ODA totaled $8.96 billion. The United
States was second with $7.66 billion, and France was third with $7.47
billion (see Table 1). In dollar terms, Japanese ODA decreased 1.9 per-
cent between 1988 and 1989, compared to the DAC total decrease of 3.4
percent.
B. Types of Development Assistance
Japan's ODA is classified into three categories: grant aid, technical
assistance and loan aid. In 1989, of the total ODA Operating Budget of
755.7 billion yen, grant aid accounted for 283.2 billion yen (37.5 percent),
technical assistance for 203.8 billion yen (27.0 percent), and loans for the
remaining 268.7 billion yen (35.5 percent).5
Grant aid is divided into Bilateral Grant Aid, which is distributed to
recipient countries, and Contributions to Multilateral Organizations,
which is distributed to multilateral organizations, such as the Unicef and
4. Top Aid Donor at 1 (cited in note 2).
5. Japan's ODA at 120 (cited in note 3).
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TABLE 1
ODA as a Percentage of GNP for Major Donor Countries
(in millions of dollars)
1989 1988 1989* % Change
Rank Country Amount % of GNP Amount % of GNP 1988-1989
1 Japan 9,134 0.32 8,958 0.32 -1.9
2 U.S. 10,141 0.21 7,664 0.15 -24.4
3 France" 6,865 0.72 7,467 0.78 8.8
4 W. Germany 4,731 0.39 4,953 0.41 4.7
5 Italy 3,193 0.39 3,325 0.39 4.1
6 U.K. 2,645 0.32 2,588 0.31 -2.1
7 Canada 2,347 0.50 2,302 0.44 -1.9
DAC Total*** 48,132 0.36 46,498 0.33 -3.4
* Preliminary
Including overseas territories and prefectures.
*** The DAC Total also includes amounts from the eleven other countries that comprise the
Organization for Economic Development's Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
These countries are the Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Fin-
land, Switzerland, Austria, New Zealand and Ireland.
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
the Asian Development Bank.6 Grant aid excludes grants in support of
technical assistance, requires no repayment, and is administered by the
Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA).7
Technical assistance is extended with the objectives of transferring
technology to recipient countries and developing their human resources.'
It consists of (1) training recipient country nationals in technical skills,
such as animal husbandry and medical care, (2) providing technical
equipment used in training, (3) dispatching Japanese Overseas Volunteers
(the Japanese version of the United States Peace Corps), and (4) under-
taking master plan and feasibility studies.9 Like grant aid it requires no
repayment, and is administered by JICA.10
Japan extends both concessional1" and nonconcessional loans to
developing countries. The Export-Import Bank of Japan (EIBJ) adminis-
6. Association for Promotion of International Cooperation, A Guide to Japan's Aid 8
(Association for Promotion of International Cooperation, 1990) ("APIC Guide').
7. Id at 11-12.
8. Id at 8.
9. Id at 61-67.
10. Id.
11. See generally Japan's ODA (cited in note 3). Concessionality refers to the extent of
subsidization present in a loan. A nonconcessional loan contains no subsidy and therefore carries
market interest rates and repayment periods. A concessional loan, on the other hand, is partially
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ters nonconcessional loans, which are not classified as ODA. The Over-
seas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) administers concessional
ODA loans after the loans have been approved by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Economic Planning Agency
(EPA).12 Most OECF loans are used to purchase equipment and services
needed for large capital projects, such as bridges, dams, electrical plants
and roads. In addition, the OECF extends loans to support debt relief.13
C. Policy
Japan uses its own development experience as a guide to helping
developing countries. Following World War II, with money borrowed
from the World Bank and the U.S., Japan rebuilt its infrastructure, which
it considers a key to its rapid industrialization. a As a result, Japan has
always emphasized large-scale infrastructure projects. Only in 1980 did
Japan include in its policy a basic human needs element emphasizing
smaller grass roots projects. However, this element of Japan's overall aid
policy and program remains small.15
Four factors primarily influence Japan's present aid policy:
(1) Japan's preference for extending loans, rather than grants, (2) private
sector interests and their pressure for tying aid to the procurement of
Japanese goods and services, (3) ensuring a steady supply of resources
needed by the Japanese economy ("resource diplomacy"), and (4) devel-
opment objectives.
subsidized. This subsidization takes such forms as lower-than-market interest rates and grace
periods during which no interest accrues. To be classified as ODA, loans must have a grant
element of at least 25 percent. In other words, the terms of a $1,000 ODA loan must make it, at
least, equivalent to a package that combines a nonconcessional loan of $750 and a grant of $250.
12. APIC Guide at 70 (cited in note 6).
13. The Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, Annual Report 1989 13 (The Overseas
Economic Cooperation Fund, 1990).
14. Gretchen Green, Japan's Foreign Aid Policy: 1989 Update, 41A Japan Economic
Institute Report I (October 27, 1989).
15. Whether a project is a basic human needs project is often difficult to determine.
Therefore, it is difficult to determine the exact proportion of Japanese projects that fit this vague
category. However, a review of the projects funded by Japan in 1989 reveals that few can be
characterized as small grass roots projects or projects which provide for basic human needs.
Most of the projects are too large and focus on infrastructure. See generally, Japan's ODA at
137-270 (cited in note 3). Even the smaller projects often do not focus on basic human needs.
For example, in 1989 Japanese ODA grants paid for musical instruments for the Shanghai
Symphony Orchestra. Id at 140.
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1. Japan's Preference for Loans
Japan has historically preferred to extend loans over grants.
Recently, however, Japan has begun distributing a greater share of its aid
as grants and technical assistance (about 64.5 percent in 1989). Japan's
continued use of loan aid and its reluctance to embrace plans allowing
debt-ridden countries to write off part of their debt, arise from deeply-held
beliefs among the Japanese that these types of aid are the most successful
tools to ensuring successful economic development.
1 6
2. Private Sector Interests and Their Pressure for Tying Aid
Japan's private sector has always heavily influenced Japan's aid pol-
icy. In the early years of Japan's aid program, they successfully lobbied
the aid bureaucracy to explicitly require recipients to spend aid on Japa-
nese goods and services. As the program has evolved, they have exerted
their influence in less visible ways.
The private sector's aim is three-fold. First, it seeks to ensure that
Japanese firms receive goods and services contracts for overseas aid
projects. Second, it wants Japanese aid funds to be used for projects that
service private Japanese facilities. Third, it wants aid to help ensure eco-
nomic and political stability in developing countries.
In the 1960s and 1970s, Japan tied a majority of its aid to purchases
of Japanese goods and services primarily using three methods: officially
tied aid, 7 mixed credits 8 and de facto tied aid.1 9 However, Japan's use
of tied aid declined during the 1980s in response to criticism from devel-
16. Japan's preference for loans stems from its experience following World War II, when it
successfully used World Bank and United States loans to rebuild its infrastructure. United
States-Japan Relations: The Impact of Negotiated Market Openings, Hearings before the
Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 165 (1988) (statement of Susan J.
Pharr, Harvard University) ("Pharr Statement').
17. "Officially tied aid" refers to aid that is distributed to recipient countries on the explicit
condition that it be used to purchase Japanese products and services.
18. "Mixed credits" refers to the practice whereby a foreign firm, in conjunction with its
government, puts together a package offering a mixture of foreign aid funds and export finance
funds as part of an overseas contract bid. The blended funding carries lower interest rates than
funding that consists of export finance funds alone, thus making mixed credit project bids more
attractive than bids supported only by export financing. See U.S. Should Develop Mixed Credit
Financing Policy, US. Business Groups Tell House Panel, 6 Intl Trade Rptr 480 (April 19, 1989).
Although tied loans resemble mixed credits, it is important to distinguish between the two.
Whereas mixed credit financing is included as part of a project bid, officially tied loans are
extended independent of any project bids.
19. "De facto tied" aid, also called "unofficially tied" aid, refers to the practice whereby a
Japanese firm steps in to assist a developing country government to select a project and apply for
Japanese aid, and then uses its intimate knowledge of the project to gain an advantage over
Winter 1992]
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oping countries, and particularly other donor countries. Only a negligible
amount of Japanese loan aid distributed in 1989 was officially tied, and
there is little proof that Tokyo is still distributing mixed credits. How-
ever, critics claim that a majority of Japanese loan aid is still de facto tied.
Grant aid is still tied to the purchase of Japanese goods and services, as is
the case for most donor countries.2 °
During the 1980s, Japan adopted a policy of gradually untying loan
aid. In 1988, 77.4 percent of loans were open for universal nonpreferen-
tial bidding, and 22.6 percent were LDC untied, which means procure-
ment of goods and services were restricted to bidders from Japanese and
developing country firms.2 1
Between 1982 and 1986, approximately 60 percent of the procure-
ment stemming from loans that were open for universal nonpreferential
bidding went to Japanese firms, 22 percent to firms from less developed
countries, 15 percent to firms from other countries, and the remaining 3
percent to recipient country firms. For LDC untied loans during the
same period, about 85 percent of the procurement went to Japanese
firms.22 Critics urge Japan to lower the proportion of LDC untied loans,
because of the high percentage of procurement that goes to Japanese
firms, which is largely due to the inability of LDC firms to compete effec-
tively with Japan. This is especially true in the case of large capital inten-
sive projects, which require expertise that usually cannot be provided by
firms from developing countries.2 3
An understanding of de facto tied aid requires a description of the
role the Japanese private sector plays in Japan's foreign aid system. Japa-
nese construction firms and trading companies have historically played a
fundamental role. Their efforts have been beneficial-filling in the many
gaps left open in government aid administration. They have also been
detrimental-seeking corporate gain at the expense of foreign aid recipi-
competitors in bidding for the projects. Often the advantage stems from the firm's edge in
fulfilling bid requirements that it has designed.
20. International Development Study Group, Shortcomings of the Foreign Aid Program,
Economic Eye 16, 17 (Spring 1989) (translated and slightly abridged from Keizai Semina
(December 1988)) ("Economic Eye').
21. Robert Orr, Jr., The Emergence of Japan's Foreign Aid Power 65 (Columbia University
Press, 1990) ("Foreign Aid Power'). Note that generally untied loans, although officially
extended free of any official ties, are often de facto tied.
22. Robert Orr, Jr., The Rising Sun: Japan's Foreign Aid to ASEAN, the Pacific Basin and
the Republic of Korea, 41 J Intl Affairs 39, 46 (Fall 1987) ("The Rising Sun').
23. Robert Orr, Jr., The Politics of Japan's Foreign Aid 18, draft paper presented at
conference-workshop sponsored by the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, Missoula
Montana, May 14-17, 1987 ("Politics of Aid').
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ents. Construction firms and trading companies are still instrumental in
the administration of Japanese foreign aid and will continue to be so in
the foreseeable future.
The Japanese private sector and the aid bureaucracy are closely tied
for two reasons. First, the Japanese aid bureaucracy is relatively small
and employs few development aid specialists.2 4 Japan has no field mis-
sions abroad and is usually represented by only two or three professionals
from JICA and OECF and an embassy official.25 Second, Japan's
request-based aid policy requires that proposals for all aid projects come
directly from recipient governments. Because its first aid flowed to South-
east Asia, Japan adopted this approach to allay fears of Japanese imperial-
ism.26 The further rationale for this policy is that it prevents Japan from
forcing unnecessary and unwanted projects onto developing countries,
thereby interfering in their internal affairs. Also, in theory, the request
policy ensures that each project has the full support of the recipient gov-
ernment, paving the way for the shift of project management to the recipi-
ent at a future date.27 The request policy has allowed Japan to maintain a
small bureaucracy because recipient governments theoretically handle
project selection and implementation. 8
The reality bears little resemblance to this no-meddling policy.
Developing countries often lack the resources to prepare aid requests and
the technicians for drafting plans. They know little about techniques for
framing applications so that they have the best chance of winning Japa-
nese government approval. Japanese corporations, therefore, step in to
identify and propose projects, putting their own interests first. These cor-
porations often recommend high-priced projects that do not necessarily
meet local needs.29 Furthermore, many Japanese trading companies
active in developing countries have extensive networks in the Japanese
government and provide the additional service of lobbying for acceptance
of the project by the Japanese government. 30 As a result, the identifica-
tion of projects is carried out, not by developing nations, but by Japanese
consulting firms, trading houses, construction companies and manufac-
24. In 1989 the Japanese government had a staff of approximately 1,600 to oversee aid
programs, compared with approximately 5,000 in the United States. Steven R. Weisman,
Foreign Aid Isn't Easy for Japan, NY Times sec 4 (August 20, 1989) ("Aid Isn't Easy').
25. Foreign Aid Power at 59 (cited in note 21).
26. Id at 60.
27. Economic Eye at 19 (cited in note 20).
28. Foreign Aid Power at 60 (cited in note 21).
29. Economic Eye at 19 (cited in note 20).
30. Foreign Aid Power at 60 (cited in note 21).
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turers. 3 ' In many cases, by the time an aid project has been requested by
the recipient country and approved by Tokyo, Japanese firms have tai-
lored the nature and specifications of the project so that it is exceedingly
difficult for non-Japanese firms to bid successfully, even if the bidding
process is open.32 Aid officials concerned with improving Japan's aid pro-
gram performance, such as those within MOFA, have had difficulty
preventing de facto tying of aid because of the unofficial nature of the
problem.33
3. Resource Diplomacy Considerations
Japan's lack of energy resources and raw materials poses a substan-
tial threat to its economic security. Specifically, Japan's economy is very
dependent on a steady supply of oil and other natural resources, such as
wood, from overseas. In response, Tokyo has deployed aid to several
regions including the Middle East and Africa in an effort to reduce these
threats.34 The 1973 oil crisis provides a good example. Following the
Yom Kippur War, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) placed an oil embargo on several countries, which included
Japan. Japan found itself vulnerable. One month following the
embargo's announcement, Japan pledged $3 billion in aid to regional oil-
producing states.35 In the 1980s and 1990s Japan has funded projects in
several countries, including Brazil and Malaysia, in furtherance of its
interest in securing a steady supply of wood.36
4. Development Objectives
Because the Japanese aid program has no legislative guidelines, it is
difficult to determine its development objectives. JICA and OECF have
stated in annual reports that the purpose of Japanese aid is to contribute
to economic and social development in developing countries and to pro-
mote international cooperation.37 Otherwise, official materials focus on
the amount of ODA, rather than on its objectives or whether those objec-
tives are being accomplished.
31. Economic Eye at 19 (cited in note 20).
32. Pharr Statement at 161 (cited in note 16).
33. Id.
34. Foreign Aid Power at 94 (cited in note 21).
35. Id at 54-55.
36. Ellen Hosmer, Aid Incorporated: The Real Beneficiaries of Japanese Foreign Assistance,
Multinational Monitor 15 (November 1988) ("Aid Incorporated').
37. Japanese International Cooperation Agency, Annual Report 1989 20 (Japanese
International Cooperation Agency, 1989). See also Japan's ODA at 13 (cited in note 3).
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Another basic tenet of the Japanese aid program is the promotion of
recipient country self reliance.38 In contrast to the United States, Japan
provides little, if any, official or explicit guidance (with the exception of
procurement) to recipient countries on how to use foreign aid. Japan
appears reluctant to encourage aid recipients to take steps to improve the
economic efficiency of projects, regarding such activity as meddling in the
domestic affairs of aid recipients.39
D. The Foreign Aid Bureaucracy
The Japanese foreign-aid bureaucracy is charged with two clear
tasks: the formulation and implementation of Japan's foreign aid policy.
However, the bureaucratic structure and procedures are not so clear. The
bureaucracy is like a jungle: always growing, always changing, and never
easy to find one's way through.
Japan's approach differs significantly from that of the United States,
where Congress generally formulates aid policy and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) implements it. In Japan there is no
legislature-enacted law establishing guidelines and rules for foreign aid
along the lines of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). Rather,
numerous executive and legislative entities formulate policy, which sev-
eral executive departments implement. There are three principal actors in
Japan's foreign aid program: (1) the Diet, (2) the policy formulation
bureaucracy, which consists of MOFA, MOF, MITI and EPA, and (3)
the implementation bureaucracy, which consists of JICA and OECF.
1. The Diet
The Diet, Japan's parliament, has always played a limited role in the
formation of foreign aid policy. To date the Diet has performed only
three legislative functions vis-a-vis foreign aid. First, each year it votes
whether to pass the annual budget allocation for aid. Unlike the budget
presented to the U.S. Congress, which includes detailed information by
recipient and aid programs, the budget presented to the Diet presents only
allocations to the various implementation agencies. Second, each year it
authorizes the carryover of undisbursed funds, but this is done on a pro
forma basis. Third, it occasionally passes resolutions prohibiting the
extension of aid for military purposes or to regions where it could worsen
38. The Rising Sun at 42 (cited in note 22).
39. Id.
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ongoing conflicts (which the bureaucracy had been unwilling to support
anyway).' The political parties and factions within those parties exert an
influence on foreign aid policy, yet their influence has been minimal.41
2. The Policy Formulation Bureaucracy-MOFA, MOF, MITI
and EPA
The bulk of Japan's foreign aid policy is formulated by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry
of International Trade and Investment (MITI), and the Economic Plan-
ning Agency (EPA).
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a strong proponent of expanding
foreign aid and using it as a foreign policy tool, is probably the most influ-
ential partner in the foreign aid bureaucracy.42 MOFA derives its power
from several sources: it oversees the entire aid process as the chair of the
three ministry/one agency system; it is the window through which devel-
oping countries issue their aid requests; it leads and dispatches survey
missions to evaluate aid requests from recipient countries; it manages
Japan's diplomatic relations; and it oversees JICA.43 MOFA's oversight
of JICA gives it considerable influence over technical assistance, subject
to the budgetary authority of MOF.4 MOFA has sole discretionary
power over the administration of grant aid, also subject to the budgetary
authority of MOF.45
The Ministry of Finance derives its power from its control of the
budgetary decision-making process. Since the distribution of the budget
affects the amount of power and influence of government organizations,
most governmental departments strive to increase their share of the
budget pie.46 MOF bureaucrats see foreign aid as strictly a budget issue.
As a result, MOF focuses on the effectiveness of aid programs versus their
40. Politics of Aid at 6 (cited in note 23). See also William L. Brooks and Robert M. Orr,
Jr., Japan's Foreign Economic Assistance, Asian Survey 322, 335 (March 1985).
41. Foreign Aid Power at 22 (cited in note 21).
42. Politics of Aid at 30 (cited in note 23).
43. Id at 29. Grants are virtually under the sole purview of the Foreign Ministry and are
not subject to the three ministry/one agency deliberation system. Id at 18.
44. Foreign Aid Power at 30 (cited in note 21).
45. Although grant assistance is the purview of MOF from a budgeting perspective, once
MOF has set the overall level of grant assistance, MOFA exercises exclusive discretionary power
over the administration of the funds. Id at 20.
46. Id.
[Intramural Issue
JAPANESE FOREIGN AID
costs, and is more concerned with waste than other parts of the
bureaucracy.47
The Ministry of International Trade and Investment, which played a
very prominent role in molding aid policy during the 1950s and 1960s,
represents Japan's commercial interests. It promotes policy that will ben-
efit Japan's private sector, such as extending tied aid and undertaking
projects that will support Japanese businesses located in developing coun-
tries. MITI always determines the extent to which aid will help or hurt
Japan's overseas market and domestic industry before taking a position
on an aid issue. MITI has been highly skeptical of the Basic Human
Needs (BHN) approach to aid, preferring large capital projects to the
BHN approach's small labor intensive projects. MITI enjoys the strong
support of business circles, a powerful constituency in Japan. In MITI,
the promotion of Japanese exports and Japanese business in developing
countries takes precedence over development concerns. MITI supports
tied aid practices and giving priority to countries with abundant natural
resources, particularly oil.4 Since Japan has begun to increase the pro-
portion of grants in its overall aid distributions, MITI's influence in
Japan's foreign aid policy has diminished because MOFA administers
Japan's grant assistance.4 9
The Economic Planning Agency occupies an often ambiguous posi-
tion within the implementation bureaucracy and has little significance
compared to the ministries. It sometimes plays a coordinating role in aid
policy and has been supportive of expanding and improving foreign assist-
ance. The EPA supervises the OECF, a function from which it derives its
principal influence. 0
3. The Implementation Bureaucracy-JICA, OECF and EIBJ
Two executive agencies implement Japan's ODA program. The Jap-
anese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) oversees the distribution
of grant aid and the implementation of technical assistance. The Overseas
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) administers all loans classified as
ODA.
The Export-Import Bank of Japan (EIBJ) plays a large role in
Japan's trade surplus recycling program, and extends debt relief in the
47. Politics of Aid at 14 (cited in note 23).
48. Id at 17-18.
49. Id at 18-20.
50. Id at 24.
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form of debt refinancing. However, its activities and structure will not be
treated in this paper because its assistance lacks the requisite grant ele-
ment to be classified as ODA.
II. SHORTCOMINGS IN THE JAPANESE AID PROGRAM
The Japanese aid program suffers from one primary flaw: It lacks
statutory guidance. Lacking basic authority to guide it, the program
often steers away from development-oriented policies. Three fundamental
shortcomings in the program have developed: (1) the funding of projects
in response to pressure from the Japanese private sector instead of in
response to the development needs of recipient countries, (2) the ineffec-
tiveness of the program's project selection and evaluation system, and (3)
the program's inattention to environmental concerns. This section will
describe each shortcoming and its effects.
A. Private Sector Influence
Because development-oriented policy is not mandated, aid adminis-
trators have little guidance in their formulation and implementation of
aid policy and are vulnerable to the influence exerted by the Japanese
private sector. The influence of private sector interests and the general
lack of development-oriented guidelines has contributed to project ineffec-
tiveness and inequity in the economic development stimulated by Japa-
nese aid funded projects.
1. Project Ineffectiveness
Examples of ineffective Japanese foreign aid funded projects are
legion. 1 The joint Japan-Indonesia Asahan aluminum smelting project
provides a complex, yet illustrative example of how the aid bureaucracy's
response to Japanese private sector influence contributes to the undertak-
ing of disastrous projects. Following the oil crises of the 1970s, Japan's
domestic smelting industry began losing its international competitive edge
51. In one project, Japan extended a $40 million grant to Indonesia for medical equipment.
Ten years later Tokyo discovered that most of the equipment was lying unused because no one in
the Indonesian hospitals knew how to operate it. Aid Isn't Easy at sec 4 (cited in note 24). There
are many stories of similar failed undertakings, such as funding of a new hospital in Pakistan that
has no patients, operation of a nearly studentless school for mariners in a remote part of the
Philippines, and funding of several dozen commuter-train cars that were soon left abandoned in
the streets of Manila due to a lack of repair facilities. Urban Lehner, Throwing Money: First in
Foreign Aid, Japan Still Isn't Sure What Purpose It Serves, Wall Street Journal 4 (July 3, 1989)
("Throwing Money').
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because of the high cost of electricity from petroleum-powered plants.
The environmental concerns of local residents also forced the closure of
many smelting plants in Japan. In response, Japan's aluminum smelting
industry turned its attention overseas, extracting financing for the over-
seas ventures from the government in the form of ODA. The Japanese
government funded much of the $2.7 billion project built on the Indone-
sian island of Sumatra. The project, completed in October 1984, included
dams, a hydroelectric power plant along the Asahan River, and a giant
aluminum smelter, making it the largest project of its kind in Asia.
Asahan originally created 2,000 jobs and supplied electricity to Medan,
Indonesia's third largest city. The Indonesian government owned 41 per-
cent of Asahan, and Japanese interests owned the remaining 59 percent.52
However, the project has failed in its goal to upgrade the overall level
of Indonesian industry and has proven to be a financial debacle. Much of
the aluminum remains stacked outside, exposed to the elements, unused
for lack of buyers. Indonesia has been unable to generate enough export
revenue from the project to repay its costly yen denominated loans.
Japan's response has been to dispense several new loans, many of which
were nonconcessional, totaling more than $1 billion in 1987 alone. In
addition, difficulties common to Japanese aid and investment projects
throughout the world have been present. Japanese have had trouble
retaining employees after expending time and money to train them. The
Japanese have been reluctant to appoint locals to top local management
positions. And they have been reluctant to transfer technology to the
Indonesian plant.53
2. Inequitable Development
Many Japanese projects promote growth, but often the growth is
inequitable. In the Philippines Japan's use of aid often helps Japanese
exporters and contractors, but often hinders Philippine economic develop-
ment. A gross example of this phenomenon involved Japan's financing of
a deep water fishing port development in northern Manila.54 The port
was built to accommodate large trawlers of the type used by Japanese
fishing fleets in the region. Most Filipino fisherman use very small trawl-
52. See Kubota Akira, Foreign Aid: Giving With One Hand?, 22 Japan Q 142 (April-June
1985). See also Bernard Wysocki, Jr., Guiding Hand: In Asia, the Japanese Hope to "Coordinate"
What Nations Produce, Wall Street Journal 1 (August 20, 1990).
53. Id.
54. Throwing Money at 4 (cited in note 51).
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ers.55 While the port activities have generated a few jobs, this minor con-
tribution to the development of the local economy was costly and
inequitable.
In the 1980s, Japanese grant and loan ODA focused almost exclu-
sively on heavy infrastructure planning and development. In Thailand,
Japanese ODA financed the construction of roads, bridges and telecom-
munications facilities, which have made Thailand attractive to Japanese
investors. The eastern seaboard development, where much of the aid
investment has been focused, was basically designed by Japanese.56 Such
development brings wealth to Thailand, but the wealth is distributed ineq-
uitably. Those lucky enough to invest in or be employed as a result of the
projects benefit from the activity, while the majority of Thais receive no
benefit but the sight of a few of their neighbors growing wealthy.
Not all Japanese foreign aid projects suffer from such shortcomings.
However, funding for projects that have efficiently and equitably benefit-
ted the poor has been inconsistent. The lack of guiding rules leaves dis-
cretion to aid bureaucrats who select projects unbridled. Often, whether
Japan undertakes an inefficient and perhaps harmful project or an efficient
and beneficial project depends solely on the inclination of the particular
bureaucrat making the selection that day, and the pressures exerted on
him or her by private sector interests.
B. Selection and Evaluation Ineffectiveness
Japan's procedures for selecting future projects and evaluating pres-
ent and past projects are ineffective. MOFA introduced a project evalua-
tion system in 1981. Official reports on Japan's development assistance
have been published annually since 1982. In 1985, the Foreign Ministry
established a separate forum for outside experts to evaluate aid projects.5 7
Theoretically, evaluations can be made a) before aid is given, b) while a
project is under way, c) immediately upon its completion, or d) at some
later point in time. Japan's appraisals tend to fall in the last category.
Their main purpose is to suggest ways of improving the efficiency of sub-
sequent projects.58
55. Id.
56. Charles Smith and Louise do Rosario, Empire of the Sun, Far Eastern Economic
Review 46, 52 (May 3, 1990).
57. Economic Eye at 17 (cited in note 20).
58. Id at 18.
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According to one group of critics, the evaluators look mainly at a
project's potential for generating profits for the companies involved. 9
When the project passes this test, the rest of the evaluation is slanted to
make the funding look good. The assessments give little weight to envi-
ronmental impact, and are not designed to elucidate the effects on the
general population in the recipient country.'
Problems are also present in the process for selecting projects to be
reviewed. Unfortunately, the standards by which ODA projects are
selected for evaluation have never been made public. Over 100 projects
are selected annually by the Economic Cooperation Committee, but how
those projects are chosen is known only to the committee members them-
selves. Since the committee is comprised entirely of MOFA officials, one
naturally suspects that they reject those projects that might embarrass the
Ministry, particularly when the assessment is to be commissioned to
independent reviewers. 61 Roughly one third (about 1,000) of the aid
projects implemented between 1981 and 1987 have been evaluated. In a
March 1989 report, MOFA determined that approximately 90 percent of
160 foreign aid projects evaluated during 1987 were implemented
effectively.62
According to Akira Takahashi, a professor of economics at Tokyo
University, "one of the most essential problems in Japan's development
aid is that neither the government nor the taxpayers have been serious
about the evaluation of impacts of aid projects on recipient communities,
though they are very strict about auditing aid activities. What impact a
project has had on the people, how the project affected the region, who
received the real benefit, and whether there was a negative aftermath are
hardly investigated.", 63
The present evaluation system is inadequate to ensure that Japanese
aid is ODA. The evaluation process may be systematic, but it does not
judge projects against consistent standards. Some evaluations focus on
whether the funds were spent in a timely fashion, some on whether the
project was profitable to the implementing firm, some on whether the pro-
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Gretchen Green, Japan's Foreign Aid Reviewed, 14B Japan Economic Institute Report
7 (April 7, 1989).
63. Akira Takahashi, The Impact of Japanese Aid on Beneficiaries: Observation in
Southeast Asia 18, paper presented at conference-workshop sponsored by the Maureen and Mike
Mansfield Foundation, Missoula Montana, May 14-17, 1987.
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ject helped to develop the recipient region, and still others focus on a
variety of other criteria. An evaluator has no obligation to look at any
specific standard and need not even consider whether a project has pro-
moted local development.
C. Inattention to Environmental Concerns
Tokyo has come under attack from environmentalists for not taking
environmental concerns into account when funding development projects.
Most objectionable has been Japan's funding of projects that seemingly
support the timber industry, such as the building in wooded areas of roads
and bridges which have no apparent use besides serving logging
operations. 64
Japan's loans to Malaysia demonstrate a glaring example of Japan's
intransigence. A $1.5 million loan financed the construction of a road in
the Limbang area of Sarawak, which cuts into lands inhabited by the
nomadic Penan tribe. Although the indigenous people claim title to the
land, logging companies have been able to establish logging operations
there. JICA awarded the project to build the road to C. Itoh and Wong, a
large Japanese trading company. JICA defends its decision, claiming that
the road was meant to assist the local people, make possible a new school
and increase medical access for the people of the interior regions. How-
ever, a report by the Japan Tropical Forest Action Network points out
that the region's school had already been there for nearly 30 years and
that medical visits continue to be made by helicopter. In addition, the
local people have neither cars nor bikes-and often no shoes-and prefer
to walk the paths rather than the hot roads. The impact of the road and
the logging it has facilitated has been devastating. Sarawak has lost more
than a third of its tropical rain forest, and logging concessions have been
given for large chunks of what remains. The Penan people in 1987 and
1988 blockaded many of the logging roads in the area, including C. Itoh
and Wong's road, to call attention to the impact that logging was having
on their way of life. They claim that their traditional hunting grounds
have been decimated, their lands have been deforested, and their rivers
have been polluted and clogged with silt from soil erosion. 6
5
Under the watchful eye of the world press and other donor countries,
Japan has become more sensitive toward environmental issues relating to
64. Aid Incorporated at 16-17 (cited in note 36).
65. Id at 16.
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aid projects, sometimes at the expense of its noninterventionist policy.
For example, in 1990 Japanese aid officials bowed to pressure from envi-
ronmentalists and human rights activists, withdrawing support for the
construction of a dam in India that would have submerged 14,744 hect-
ares of forest land and displaced 100,000 people, mostly ethnic tribesmen.
This reversal came in the face of great pressure from the Indian govern-
ment to support the construction of the dam. 6
Japan has formally responded to the criticisms by requiring environ-
mental impact studies (EISs) for projects that might have a substantial
effect on the environment. Less clear is how aid administrators will use
the impact studies. The only guidance given to them is that they must
"increase the emphasis on environmental considerations in their aid activ-
ities."'6 7 It appears that this vague directive has not been effective. So far,
the undertaking of EISs seems to have been intended more to alleviate
criticism than to address the real problem.
68
The most egregious examples involve Japan's development activities
in Brazil's rain forests. In 1988 the U.S. Foreign Relations Committee
revealed that JICA recommended that EISs on the Greater Carrayas
Development Project in Brazil be done secretly so as to avoid interna-
tional criticism. 69 In 1989 environmental concerns over the effect of
development in rain forest areas were raised when it was reported that
Japan was considering financing a $300 million road through a rain forest.
Japanese leaders have denied any such plans.7'
Recently, when the Indonesian government requested a $148.3 mil-
lion loan from Japan's OECF to fund a large hydroelectric power plant
on Sumatra (total cost of $257.7 million), OECF officials reportedly
stated that they would only make a decision on the loan request after an
EIS was conducted.7 1 Japan's requirement of an EIS is encouraging.
However, substantial progress will only occur when aid administrators
are supplied with guidelines by which to judge the project's feasibility
based on the findings of the EIS.
66. Edmund Klamann, Aid Machine Struggles with Ecology Issues, Nihon Keizai Shimbun
(Japan Economic Journal) 1 (June 30, 1990).
67. Japan's ODA at 51 (cited in note 3).
68. Aid Incorporated at 16 (cited in note 36).
69. Id.
70. Douglas Ostrem, Japan Edges to Center Stage on LDC Debt, 9B Japan Economic
Institute Report 4 (March 6, 1990).
71. Asia News: Indonesia Assures Japan on Dam Project, Kyodo News Service (April 23,
1990).
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Japan, a country that is very conscious of its image among other
countries and that prides itself on its efficiency, should respond to these
problems in its flagship aid program. To do so, it must take steps to elimi-
nate the basic flaws underlying these problems.
III. RECOMMENDATION AND ITS IMPACTS
A. Japan Must Enact Basic Guiding Legislation
The Japanese leadership must respond to the shortcomings in
Japan's aid program by enacting basic and comprehensive guiding legisla-
tion. Appropriate guiding legislation would provide guidance to aid
bureaucrats in virtually all foreign aid decisions. It would provide a foun-
dation on which the Japanese legislature could enact more directed legis-
lation. It would require the Japanese populace through their legislators to
make a fundamental decision on the future direction of their aid program.
And, if properly formulated, it would ensure that Japanese foreign aid is
properly labeled ODA and would send a firm message to the rest of the
world that Japan has adopted a development-oriented aid philosophy.
Enactment of such basic guiding legislation is imperative.
The basic guiding legislation should be simple and far-reaching.
First, it should require that promoting the equitable economic develop-
ment and the welfare of developing countries be the primary objective of
Japanese aid. This would help ensure that Japan's aid is properly classi-
fied as ODA and would provide an over-arching principle to guide aid
administrators in their decision-making. Second, the legislation should
flesh out the meaning of equitable economic development and welfare by
establishing criteria that aid administrators must consider when evaluat-
ing past projects and considering future ones.
Based on the above considerations, I propose that Japan adopt the
following legislation:
72
(A) Japanese aid shall be administered with the promotion of
(1) the equitable economic development and
(2) the welfare of developing countries as its main objective.
(B) Each project funding decision and each project evaluation
shall take into consideration, in determining whether the
project forwards the main objective stated in part (A),
whether the project forwards the following objectives:
72. Ideas for these criteria came largely from Section 102(b)(4) of the United States
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 USC § 2151-1(b)(4) (1982).
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(1) increase in agricultural productivity per unit of land
through small-farm, labor intensive agriculture;
(2) reduction of infant mortality;
(3) control of population growth;
(4) promotion of greater equality of income distribution,
including measures such as more progressive taxation
and more equitable returns to small farmers;
(5) reduction of unemployment and underemployment;
(6) preservation of the environment; and
(7) increase in literacy.
(C) Projects that do not forward the main objective stated in
part A, in light of the objectives stated in part B, shall not
be funded.
Such a directive would place the development and welfare interests
of the recipient country before all other considerations and would thereby
force the aid administration to eliminate funding of nondevelopment-ori-
ented projects.
B. Impact of the Guiding Legislation
Such guiding legislation would help eradicate many of the basic flaws
present in the Japanese foreign aid program, because the lack of guidance
is at the root of many of the flaws. It would establish a hierarchy of
interests with development concerns at the pinnacle. Aid administrators
would have a frame of reference when deciding whether to fund aid
projects, a sharp contrast to the haphazard method presently used. It
would limit funding for projects built for the Japanese private sector that
either harm or negligibly help the alleged aid recipients. For example, the
logging road through Sarawak would not be funded under part C, because
its primary objective-to assist the Japanese wood industry--conflicts
with the main objective as stated in part A, especially in light of the pro-
ject's harmful effect on the environment, which conflicts with the sixth
criterion set forth in part B. Similarly, the Philippine port facility
described above would be denied funding under part C, because its pri-
mary objective is to assist Japanese fishing fleets, not the local residents of
Manila.
Such basic guiding legislation would give the aid administration a
standard around which it could build an effective evaluation mechanism.
Further legislation or regulations conforming to the guiding legislation
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would be required to flesh out the evaluation process and its specific
standards.
This legislation would obstruct the Japanese aid administration's
long-standing practice of limiting its contemplation of the environmental
effects of aid projects to those instances where it receives pressure from
outside groups. It would require aid administrators to balance the harm-
ful environmental effects of projects against their overall contribution to
the recipient country's equitable economic development and welfare.
Thus, environmentally harmful projects that would only minimally bene-
fit the local recipients would not be funded. Environmental impact state-
ments (EISs) would have a very different function; administrators would
have guidance while both undertaking EISs and evaluating their findings.
Such legislation would also provide a basis and a focus for further envi-
ronmental legislation and regulation.
CONCLUSION
Because Japan is the largest aid donor in the world, system-wide
shortcomings in its aid program have mammoth negative ramifications
throughout the developing world. Requiring Japanese aid to satisfy the
internationally determined requirements of Official Development Assist-
ance would bring about sweeping changes in the character of Japanese
aid, and the improvements would benefit the developing world on an
enormous scale. In the wake of the Gulf War, Japan has deflected criti-
cism that it is shirking its world power duties by pointing to its massive
aid contributions to developing countries. Donor and donee countries
should use this opportunity to persuade Japan to adopt development and
welfare oriented policy by pointing out that Japan's alleged aid flows often
do not constitute Official Development Assistance and are often designed
to benefit Japan more than recipient countries. In addition, it appears
that Japan's foreign aid policy is in a state of flux. In April 1991, former
prime minister Toshiki Kaifu, while emphasizing that Japan would still
regard a recipient's needs as its primary consideration, stated that Japan
has included some new criteria into the calculus of its aid policy; Japan
will base future aid decisions on whether it thinks the recipient country
spends too much on its military, and on the country's efforts to promote
democracy, basic human rights, and a market-oriented economy.73 The
73. Associated Press, Japan Links Foreign Aid, Peace Policy, Chicago Tribune 19 (April 11,
1991).
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world community must take advantage of this flux and persuade Japan at
the very least to adopt basic comprehensive guiding legislation parallel to
the language found in the definition of ODA, and if possible to expand the
legislation to include the suggested criteria and specific measures directed
at solving already identified problems.

